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Abstract	
When do parliaments debate European Union policies? Normative arguments suggest that 
debates enhance government accountability. Others warn of government bias, declining 
debate near elections, and parties avoiding Eurosceptic publics. Our conclusions are more 
differentiated. We argue that rank-and-file parliamentarians rather than leaders initiate 
debates. Political incentives guide their debate selection towards salient policies in the 
countries in which voters care most. However, where the motivation Eurosceptic publics 
provide and institutions facilitating rank-and-file agenda-setting are lacking, EU law-making 
and European Council priorities will raise little parliamentary attention. Analysis of original 
data, using a Bayesian and multilevel framework, lends credibility to our views. Claims of a 
government bias, election effects, or trends towards more debate are unlikely to hold in all 
countries. 
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Introduction	
When and why do we observe parliamentary debates about the policies of the European 
Union (EU)? De Wilde and Raunio (2015) make the normative argument that parliamentary 
debate is most needed in the EU’s salient core state policies—the policies that have drawn 
the European Council ever more into the details of policy-making and dominated public 
controversy on European integration post-Maastricht (Bickerton et al., 2015; Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009). In these areas, debates are of greatest relevance for interested audiences. 
Here, parliaments could indeed enhance public information and even governmental 
accountability, as some scholars suggest (Auel and Raunio, 2014b; Auel et al., 2015; Bellamy 
and Kröger, 2016; Rauh and De Wilde, 2018; Hoerner, 2017; Senninger, 2017). Yet, can we 
expect parliaments to direct their attention in this way? 
We explain our argument based on the two most ambitious studies to date. This is not to 
deny the importance of many qualitative and case studies (Auel and Raunio, 2014a; Kinski, 
2016; Wendler, 2014). However, these studies do not tell us the conditions of debate over 
many years, parties, and countries.  In their investigation of EU debate in 27 parliaments, 
Auel and colleagues (2015) find that institutional resources, such as information rights, best 
explain debate, although Eurosceptic parties and Eurozone membership matters as well. 
Investigating debates in four countries over 20 years, Rauh and de Wilde (2018) likewise 
conclude that institutional resources matter. They also find a systematic relationship 
between debates, European Council summits, and EU directives. Yet, they urge caution 
regarding the accountability potential of debates based on the result that governments are 
mostly responsible for EU debates, and that parties talk less about the EU near elections and 
to Eurosceptic publics. 
Our argument differs in some critical respects. We agree that institutional resources and 
Euroscepticism constitute essential political context. Yet, we consider Euroscepticism a 
positive motivation to engage in debates on the EU rather than a reason to avoid debate 
(see e.g. Finke and Dannwolf, 2013; Gattermann and Hefftler, 2015; Williams, 2016). We 
share the view that debates follow European Council meetings and EU laws, albeit in a highly 
contingent way. First, we contend that this relationship only exists where Euroscepticism 
and institutional resources provide parliamentarians with the necessary motivation and 
capacity (for a similar argument on the use of the early warning system, see Gattermann and 
Hefftler, 2015). Second, the policy context has been downplayed in the literature (but see de 
Ruiter, 2013; Finke and Dannwolf, 2013). Yet, EU laws are likely to attract more routine 
attention in the EU’s regulatory policies in which the Union’s legislative importance is widely 
understood. In core state policies, debate is likely to focus on the more visible controversies 
surrounding the European Council agenda.  
Central to our reasoning is the view that few actors in parliament are strongly interested in 
EU debates. For party leaders, multidimensional wedge issues are unappealing since they 
hinder the articulation of the party message (de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Green-Pedersen, 
2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). We focus on backbenchers’ interests. Yet, even though 
many studies suggest that rank-and-file politicians predominantly shoulder the burden of EU 
monitoring (for a review, see e.g. Raunio, 2009), the motivational and institutional hurdles 
for EU debate are high, and will only be overcome where extra-parliamentary contestation 
and intra-parliamentary monitoring of the EU is already significant.  
If the political context is right, parliamentarians will nonetheless choose their debates 
carefully. Prominent European Council summits are likely to attract their attention more 
than the less visible law-making process. This is likely to be the case in particular in 
sovereignty-sensitive core state policies in which politicians are more concerned with 
principled arguments about the desirability of European competences than the minutiae of 
legislative scrutiny (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014a). 
Empirically, we introduce new, hand-coded debate data on five countries over 10 years. This 
data complements available cross-sectional data (Auel et al., 2015) and dictionary-based 
longitudinal data (Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). It incorporates additional information on the 
policy areas of EU debate and agenda-setting parties. Furthermore, we offer a disaggregated 
and multilevel analysis in a Bayesian framework compared to recent pooled and cross-
sectional studies. 
The results lend credibility to key parts of our argument. In the absence of Euroscepticism 
and institutional capacity, countries experience very little parliamentary EU debate. Where 
these conditions exist, parties pay systematic attention to EU law-making and the European 
Council. Regulatory policies and high institutional capacity seem to be particularly conducive 
to debates on EU law proposals and, less clearly, adopted EU directives. Core state policies 
and high Euroscepticism especially encourage attention to the European Council. Claims as 
to a government bias, declining debate near elections, the relevance of intra-party dissent, 
or the existence of a long-term trend towards more debate may be valid in some but not all 
countries.  
Parties,	backbenchers	and	parliamentary	debate	on	the	EU	
Our explanation of parliamentary EU debate focuses on the incentives of rank-and-file 
parliamentarians. The reason is the prevalent view that party leaders are unlikely initiators 
of many EU debates. Scholars conceptualize EU related topics as wedge issues that cross-cut 
the political space (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015; de Vries and Hobolt, 2012; Green-Pedersen, 
2012; König et al., 2017). The multidimensional character of EU topics makes them ill-suited 
for the communication of parties’ messages to voters and coalition partners (de Vries and 
Hobolt, 2012; Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). Hence, Green-Pedersen 
(2012) argues that EU debates are unlikely first choices of most party leaders. We do not 
rule out that this could be different for Eurosceptic challengers (e.g. Auel et al., 2015; 
Hoerner, 2017; Senninger, 2017). Yet, our interest, following demands in the literature 
(Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hutter and Grande, 2014), lies with the centrist parties for which EU 
debate is more puzzling. 
Leadership disinterest does not automatically imply backbench relevance. Yet, all 
parliamentary parties divide work between leaders and other parliamentarians. For theories 
of legislative organization, this division is understood as an exchange (e.g. Strøm, 1998; 
Martin, 2014). Leaders entrust policy monitoring to group members in committees. In return 
for the costly monitoring effort, the rank-and-file obtain privileges in their area. These, we 
suggest, include the right to speak on a policy in parliament, and thus to reap visibility and 
reputation gains. Consequently, most parliamentary debate will reflect policy specialists’ 
concerns and the policy agendas that they encounter in their domains. 
We by no means maintain that this mechanism applies to all situations but it describes the 
case of EU affairs. Empirical evidence suggests that already by the late 1990s the monitoring 
of EU affairs had become the task of policy specialists in the parliamentary parties and 
committees. All member state parliaments had detailed procedures for the scrutiny of the 
EU in standing committees (e.g. Bergman, 1997; Raunio, 2009; Winzen, 2012). Even 
parliaments such as the British House of Commons, reputed for weak specialization (André 
et al., 2016), had committees and elaborate rules for EU monitoring (e.g. Carter, 2001). 
By leaving the EU to the party rank-and-file, party leaders make them the principal 
reservoir—and explanatory starting point—for EU debates. This does not rule out occasional 
leadership attention to the EU. For instance, plenary debates after the biannual European 
Council summits are common across the EU. These debates are overdetermined by 
leadership and rank-and-file demands and parliamentary rules. We certainly also expect 
debates on major events such as treaty reforms (Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). However, our 
goal is not to explain the one salient debate that follows a European Council meeting but 
rather regular parliamentary engagement with the EU’s legislative and policy agenda, over 
many debates and policy areas. We need to understand who, in parliament, could be 
interested in EU affairs on a regular basis. This is why we emphasize the rank-and-file more 
than party leaderships.  
Policy	choice:	Which	EU	topics	for	the	plenary?	
The expectation that backbenchers pay most attention to EU affairs neither explains which 
EU topics they would consider interesting, nor whether they have the motivation or 
institutional resources to initiate debates. 
For rank-and-file parliamentarians, not all EU topics are worth their plenary time. Yet, they 
cannot always ignore the EU without inviting criticism of their policy literacy. This leads 
existing studies to the plausible expectation that salient EU policy and legislative 
developments are most likely to trigger parliamentary debate, since the rank-and-file cannot 
ignore them and are likely aware of them. Likely candidates for more regular parliamentary 
attention are the European Council agenda and proposed and adopted EU directives (e.g. 
Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). These inputs could plausibly explain selective parliamentary 
attention to some policies rather than others, since the European Council’s priorities 
(Alexandrova et al., 2014) and EU law-production vary across policies (e.g. Franchino and 
Hoyland, 2009). 
In addition, we suspect that the relative importance of the European Council and EU law-
making differs across policy domains. We distinguish regulatory and core state policies 
(Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2014b). Core state policies are historical state monopolies and 
symbolically relevant for national sovereignty, such as justice and budgetary matters. 
Regulatory policies are the Union’s market-making and market-flanking competences, such 
as the internal market, consumer protection, or environment. The European Council and the 
legislative process could inspire parliamentary debate in both. However, legislators might 
pay more attention to the European Council in core state policies and to legislation in 
regulatory policies. 
In regulatory policies, there is a large and consolidated body of EU law that parliamentarians 
cannot ignore without having their policy literacy questioned. For instance, MPs cannot 
afford neglecting internal market legislation (e.g. the services directive), which often impacts 
visibly on the economic well-being of citizens and companies. In these areas, the fact that 
the EU is one of the most important sources of rule-making is well-understood. 
Parliamentarians working on regulatory policies are likely to routinely pay attention to the 
Union’s legislative output and the potential need for debating this output in plenary. 
In core state policies, both EU legislation and European Council attention could encourage 
debate. Certainly, one could imagine particularly sensitive reactions of parliamentarians 
when the EU prescribes rules in these areas through legislation. Yet, in our view, an 
alternative hypothesis that suggests greater attention to the European Council and less to 
legislation makes more sense. There are two reasons for this. First, in areas such as internal 
security, monetary policy or taxation, the legislative activity of the EU can in fact be quite 
indirect and subtle once we look beyond isolated, salient examples such as the European 
Arrest Warrant  (Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 2011; Herschinger et al., 2011). These laws 
could go unnoticed by parliamentarians.  
The second and more important reason that the European Council might affect debate more 
than EU legislation in core state policies is the visibility of the European Council in core state 
policies. Parliamentarians are likely to be attracted by the salient conflicts over European 
integration that have dominated post-Maastricht debates in core state policies (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009). The main arena of these debates has been the European Council rather than 
the ordinary legislative procedure (Bickerton et al., 2015). This does not mean that rank-and-
file politicians disregard legislation entirely but that the European Council will attract their 
attention more reliably. In addition, if party leaders are on occasion interested in EU 
debates, core state policies debated in the European Council are the most likely candidates. 
We summarize these arguments in two hypotheses: 
H1: The more directives the EU proposes (H1.1) and adopts (H1.2) in a policy area, the more 
EU debates parties initiate in that policy area, especially in regulatory policies. 
H2: The greater the European Council’s attention to a policy area, the more EU debates 
parties initiate in that policy area, especially in core state policies. 
Political	context:	Backbenchers’	agenda-setting	motivation	and	capacity	
Legislative activity and the European Council could interest rank-and-file parliamentarians. 
Yet, what motivates and enables them to act on these opportunities? We suggest cross-
national differences in motivation and capacity. 
Since politicians will focus their debates on topics contested in the electorate, we conceive 
of motivation in terms of Euroscepticism. In many member states, EU membership remains 
uncontested. Yet, in some countries such as Britain Eurosceptic voters trigger conflicts over 
European integration. In more Eurosceptic countries, it is plausible that parliamentarians 
perceive public interest in their stances on EU laws and policies. Elsewhere, it is not only 
unclear whether backbenchers have anything to gain from EU debates in terms of their 
visibility and reputation. It is not certain that they even care to monitor EU affairs if voters 
never inquire as to their stances on the Union’s activities. 
We conceive of the agenda-setting capacity of the rank-and-file in terms of institutions. 
While one should consider the agenda-setting rights of leaders and followers (Proksch and 
Slapin, 2012), we also stress rules and procedures that help parliamentarians acquire 
information on EU policy-making (’information resources’). We will return to agenda-setting 
rules in the case selection. Information resources are important since the default focus of 
party politicians is likely to be on domestic rather than EU issues. Formal monitoring 
procedures and information flows play a crucial role in generating attention. Institutional 
capacity thus means the regular supply of EU information to the rank-and-file through strong 
oversight procedures existing in some parliaments (e.g. Winzen, 2012). Plausibly, variation in 
these procedures has been found to correlate with the extent of EU debate (Auel et al., 
2015; Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). 
Motivation and capacity are not simply additional explanations alongside EU directives and 
European Council attention. They constitute the necessary political context, in the absence 
of which parliamentarians lack the willingness, ability and awareness required to act on their 
opportunities for EU debates. This still leaves parliaments with the kind of over-determined 
debates mentioned earlier—following key events such as treaty changes or biannual 
European Council summits. The complete absence of debate should not be expected. 
However, where willingness and capacity are missing, parliamentary EU debate lacks intra-
parliamentary advocates.  
H3: In the absence of motivation and institutional capacity, the amount of EU directives in 
(H1.1 and H1.2) and European Council attention to (H2) a policy area, does not 
systematically relate to the number of EU debates a party initiates in that policy area. 
Case	selection	
Our analysis relies on data from Austria (AT), Germany (DE), the Netherlands (NL), Spain (ES), 
and the United Kingdom (UK). Figure 1 (a) shows cross-national variation in political 
motivation and institutional capacity. We measure Euroscepticism as the share of citizens 
considering EU membership a ‘bad thing’ minus ‘a good thing’ based on Eurobarometer 
data. We operationalize institutional capacity by using an existing index of the strength of EU 
oversight institutions in member state parliaments (Winzen, 2012).1  
---Figure 1--- 
In addition to the information in Figure 1, we draw on Proksch and Slapin (2012) who show 
that speaker selection rules matter. Rules that empower the rank-and-file to act on their 
debate opportunities could encourage EU debate. Selection rules are themselves 
manifestations of electoral incentives (Proksch and Slapin, 2012: 528). This reasoning 
suggests more EU debate in the UK and in Germany, due to their partly personalized 
electoral systems, compared to the remaining countries with weak personal vote incentives. 
These information indicate good conditions for EU debate in Britain and Germany: relatively 
high Euroscepticism, institutional capacity, and backbench-friendly agenda-setting 
conditions. The conditions are unfavorable in the Netherlands and Spain. Austria falls in the 
middle with lower motivation (compared to UK), institutional capacity (compared to 
Germany), and unfriendly agenda-setting conditions.2 This case will help us understand how 
high the hurdles for backbench attention to the EU are. 
The research design considers the notion that there are ’working’ and ’talking’ parliaments. 
Figure 1 (b) shows more parliamentary debates in Britain than elsewhere. The working-
talking divide thus suggests most EU debates in the UK, least in Austria, and comparable 
levels in the remaining countries. Only the expectation of many debates in the UK overlaps 
with our argument. 
Our case selection controls for the possibility that EU debates stem from Eurosceptic 
challenger parties (e.g. Auel et al., 2015; Hoerner, 2017; Senninger, 2017;). Our countries 
contain some of Europe’s most successful challenger parties in terms of parliamentary seats, 
in Austria (the Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, FPÖ, and the Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, BZÖ) 
and the Netherlands (the Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV). In the other countries, challengers 
remain weak (the German Left), emerged only very recently (Germany and Spain) or remain 
without noteworthy representation (Britain). If challenger parties drive EU debate, Austria 
and the Netherlands rather than Britain and Germany should see most debates. In the 
British House of Commons, Eurosceptic opposition might be found within centrist parties. 
The analysis will examine the link between intra-party dissent and EU debate.  
Data	
We code parliamentary debates from 2003-2012. An EU debate is one that would have 
looked substantially different had the speakers not discussed the EU institutions and 
policies. We judge debates in these terms after reading the titles and transcripts in the 
official parliamentary record. Relying on judgment is less reliable than automated coding 
since it involves a human component as opposed to, for instance, the automatic counting of 
words in a dictionary. Yet, inter-coder reliability tests yielded reassuring results.3 Upon 
reading the transcript, it is often clear whether a debate is about the EU or not, such as 
when a European Council meeting or the implementation of an EU law is on the agenda. We 
see no obvious validity disadvantage to automated coding based on a dictionary (Rauh and 
De Wilde, 2018). Not only does drawing up the dictionary entail a human component as well, 
discussions of the validity of automated text analysis also suggest that ‘supervised 
classification methods [require] demonstrating that the classification from machines 
replicates hand coding’ (Grimmer and Stewart, 2013: 28). All our data was coded by 
ourselves and trained assistants. 
We record information on policy area and debate initiators. We sort each debate into ten 
aggregate areas corresponding to divisions in EU policy-making (see the Online appendix). 
Based on debate title and transcript, we identify the ‘initiator’ of a debate, the party that has 
formally put an item forward. Parties sometimes co-initiate a debate in Austria and 
Germany. We consider parties as initiators of all agenda items they put forward, regardless 
of co-authors. We thus assume that subscribing to a debate is voluntary and can be 
conceptualized as a party’s choice. 
Main variables 
EU debates. We aggregate our dataset to the party level, observed biannually between 2003 
and 2012. The summer and winter breaks distinguish phases of parliamentary activity 
relatively well. New governments often begin after the summer or in January. We also 
distinguish debates focusing on EU policies from implementation debates. We return to this 
distinction in the analysis. 
European Council priorities. The ‘comparative policy agendas’ dataset records the 
percentage of European Council conclusions devoted to a policy (Alexandrova et al., 2014).4 
We match the ‘comparative policy agendas’ areas to ours (see the Online appendix). 
Adopted EU directives. We obtain information on newly adopted EU directives from an EU 
law dataset (Duttle et al., 2017). A lag is in order since debate is most likely when these 
adopted EU directives require implementation. After the adoption of a directive, countries 
typically have a time window of 1-2 years for implementation. We examined different lags 
and show the one with the strongest bivariate relationship to EU debates (i.e. a 1-year lag).  
EU proposals for directives. Data on proposals for EU directives come from Häge (2011) who 
extracted these data from the EU’s pre-lex archive. We explored different lags. The 3-
semester lag used here showed the strongest relationships to EU debates.  
Core state and regulatory policies. Our data comprises ten policy areas (see the Online 
appendix). We follow the literature by coding budget and finance, justice and home affairs, 
external and defense, and institutions as core state policies (e.g. Genschel and Jachtenfuchs, 
2014a). 
Euroscepticism and EU oversight institutions. See section on country cases and note 2. 
We control for seat share, government status, election periods, and intra-party 
disagreement on European integration based on Chapel Hill surveys (Bakker et al., 2015). 
Due to rather few parties in our data, we refrain from further party-level variables.5 The 
corresponding summary statistics can be found in the Online appendix. 
Mapping	parliamentary	debates	
Our analysis focuses on centrist parties because our theoretical argument applies to them.6 
The Online appendix shows the EU-related debates of all parties in our data in greater detail. 
One insight is that British and German parties initiate more EU debates than their 
counterparts. There also is a lot of variation in partisan debate priorities over time and 
across policies. 
Figure 2 supports our case selection and findings from the literature. Governing parties 
initiate more EU debates than opposition parties. Semesters with elections see fewer 
debates (Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). Parties with more seats initiate more debates. There is 
at best a very mild time trend. Disaggregating into countries does not yield a clear time 
trend either (not shown). Parties in the British ’talking parliament’ initiate more EU debates 
than parties elsewhere but, beyond the House of Commons, there is no clear pattern. There 
is a positive correlation between Euroscepticism, EU oversight institutions, and debate. 
Euroscepticism and EU oversight institutions cannot explain party-level and most temporal 
differences but still account for 35% and 6% of variation in the data. These figures increase 
to 62% and 30% if we aggregate to the country level. There are positive relationships 
between European Council attention and proposed EU directives and EU debates in a policy 
area, but not with adopted EU directives. Additional figures of bivariate relationships by 
country are included in the Online appendix. 
---Figure 2--- 
Statistical	analysis	
Model 
Since our analysis is observational, we do not make causal claims but we take steps to 
enhance confidence in the results. Since we expect different results across countries and 
policies, we present separate analyses for each country and for regulatory and core state 
policies. Within countries and policy types, the data are nested in parties, policy sub-fields, 
and years. Rauh and de Wilde (2018) opted for full pooling. The alternatives are no pooling 
and partial pooling. Scholars caution that no pooling (i.e. fixed effects) overfits the data and 
depletes variation (e.g. Plümper et al., 2005). Yet, full pooling ignores clustering and likely 
underfits the data (e.g. McElreath, 2015: 364-370). We opt for the third option, a multilevel 
model that partially pools information using varying parameters (random effects). 
Our data are counts. Compared to the poisson distribution, they are overdispersed. 
Moreover, in the Netherlands and Spain few EU debates take place. Two standard solutions 
are: the use of a negative binomial distribution or the inclusion of observation-level random 
intercepts in a poisson-based multilevel model (McElreath, 2015: 355-386). The latter 
models individual deviations from the counts expected by a poisson distribution and also 
absorbs other forms of heterogeneity. We follow this approach since it matches our 
multilevel structure. 
Our model assumes that individual debate observations are drawn from a poisson 
distribution with central tendency λ. Through a log-link, lambda is determined by a linear 
function of the explanatory variables, a global intercept α and observation, party, policy, and 
year intercepts with variances σi, σparty, σarea, σyear. We make mildly regularizing prior 
assumptions centered on no relationship between the variables and the outcome. Because 
σi proves hard to estimate efficiently, we apply a more restrictive prior, after having 
explored less restrictive priors. The Online appendix shows the full model equation. 
We fit the model using RStan (Stan Development Team, 2016) and McElreath’s (2015) 
convenience functions. For each model, we ran four Monte Carlo Markov chains of 10.000 
steps (including 5000 warm up) each. Trace plots and the potential scale reduction factor 
suggest that the all chains converged (see the Online appendix for selected trace plots). 
Posterior predictive checks show good model fit (not shown, available in the replication 
material).7 
Results 
Figure 3 summarizes mean parameter estimates and 95%-highest posterior density intervals 
(HPDI). The coefficients cannot be interpreted directly except in their direction. Interestingly, 
key findings in the literature do not hold in all contexts. We observe a government bias in 
regulatory and core state policies, albeit only in Austria, Britain, and Germany. There is no 
consistent relationship between intra-party dissent and EU debate. Elections seem to 
depress debate but mainly in core state powers, and not in Britain. The descriptive patterns 
shown earlier gloss over important contextual differences. 
---Figure 3--- 
We examine our argument on the basis of Figure 4, which shows median posterior 
predictions with more and less conservative representations of uncertainty, for an 
opposition party with the other variables at their means.8 In Britain, each party initiates 
about one extra EU debate per semester and policy under conditions of high European 
Council attention to a policy area. In Germany, this relationship is similar in core state 
policies but weaker in regulatory policies. Here the high motivation in the case of the UK 
seems to drive the effects somewhat more than the high capacity in the case of Germany. In 
the remaining countries the relationships are mostly flat. The Austrian combination of 
moderate motivation and capacity does not seem to suffice to encourage systematic 
attention to the European Council agenda. In the Netherlands, attention to the European 
Council in core state policies is comparable to that in Germany in regulatory policies. The 
Spanish data is most difficult to interpret. The relationship of debates and European Council 
activity could be quite strong but, empirically, there are no observations with many EU 
debates and uncertainty is large. Uncertainty is generally high, albeit less than in Spain, as 
parliamentary debates prove hard to predict precisely but the central tendencies are broadly 
in line with expectations. 
---Figure 4--- 
Let us turn to the relationship between EU debates, adopted and proposed directives. 
Regarding adopted directives, we observe a mildly positive impact on EU debates in 
regulatory policies in Germany. Otherwise, all relationships are basically flat and highly 
uncertain (only shown in the Online appendix). Proposed directives (Figure 5) go together 
with more parliamentary debate on the EU in Germany, in particular in core state policies. In 
Britain, law proposals coincide with debate in regulatory policies. The pattern is less clear in 
core state policies. Here the high capacity in the case of Germany seems to drive the effects 
more than the high motivation in the case of the UK. In all other countries, the relationships 
are again flat (only shown in the Online appendix). 
---Figure 5--- 
Full	models	and	disaggregated	outcomes	
The British and German data contain enough information to enable us to incorporate key 
case selection variables—Euroscepticism and overall debates—into the analysis. For reasons 
of space, we show these results in full in the Online appendix and summarize them here. By 
tendency, Euroscepticism encourages debates although less clearly compared to the 
differences between countries informing the case selection. Unsurprisingly, EU debates also 
follow the ebb and flow of the general debate activity of the British and German 
parliaments. European Council attention matters but, in regulatory policies, not as clearly in 
Germany. EU law proposals coincide with EU debate in the Bundestag. In regulatory policies, 
even directives seem to have this effect. In the full models, neither directives nor law 
proposals clearly lead to more EU debate in Britain. These results rather strengthen the 
impression that following the legislative process systematically presupposes high 
institutional capacity. 
Finally, our data also identifies whether EU debates focus on the implementation of EU law 
or rather on EU public policy (see Online appendix). Based on this distinction, we generate 
two new dependent variables: EU implementation debates and EU policy debates. One 
would expect that the adoption of EU directives generates implementation rather than 
policy debates. The European Council and EU proposals for new directives should generate 
policy debates. Since this reduces the observed debates the results must be taken with 
caution. Plausible patterns can be observed nonetheless. The European Council agenda 
relates somewhat more to policy than implementation debates in Britain and Germany, even 
though the differences are small. EU law proposals also encourage policy debates more than 
implementation debates. Adopted directives rather result in implementation than policy 
debates in Germany even though, again, the differences are small. It is also interesting to 
note that the government bias in debates might, at least in Germany, be limited to the 
implementation of EU law—a task that inevitably falls to the government.  
Review	of	results	
Two key points emerge. First, there are more debates and stronger relationships in Britain 
and Germany than elsewhere. The mix of institutional capacity, motivation and agenda-
setting conditions in these countries seems conducive to debate, in line with H3. The 
combination of moderate capacity and motivation and unfriendly agenda rules in Austria 
also encourages debates but less frequently. This combination does not seem to be enough 
to link debates systematically to EU law-making and policy processes. The hurdles for such 
systematic parliamentary debate appear to be substantial. 
Second, in Britain, where Euroscepticism is high and institutional capacity moderate, the 
European Council receives somewhat more attention than in Germany. In Germany, the 
European Council agenda might only matter in core state policies. This supports H2 insofar 
that the context of core state policies seems to allow for attention to the European Council 
in Germany despite the fact that Euroscepticism is ’only’ moderate. In Germany, where 
institutional capacity is high but Euroscepticism moderate, proposed EU directives receive 
somewhat more attention than in the UK,  where law proposals only coincide with debate in 
regulatory policies. This supports H1 in the sense that the regulatory policy context seems to 
facilitate British debate despite weaker institutional capacity compared to Germany. 
Our hypotheses also warrant critical examination. Where Euroscepticism is high, 
parliamentarians systematically monitor the European Council’s policy agenda in debates 
regardless of whether it is active in regulatory or core state policies. Where institutional 
capacity is high, we observe systematic reactions to EU law proposals across policy contexts. 
Overall, this suggests that, at least in our sample, favorable political context (H3) can trump 
disincentives arising from policy context (H1 & H2). However, to complicate matters, political 
context might be policy-specific: high Euroscepticism encourages attention to the European 
Council even in unfavorable policy context (i.e. regulatory policies). High institutional 
capacity generates attention for law-making in core state policies. 
Conclusion	
We began with de Wilde and Raunio’s (2015) normative statement that parliamentary 
debate is most needed and relevant for the public in core state policies and regarding 
European Council activities. Against this standard, our arguments and evidence are, in 
principle, optimistic. We see rank-and-file parliamentarians as the main drivers of EU 
debate. Their political incentives are such that debates should be expected in the countries 
where citizens care most, on the activities of the European Council, and also on EU law-
making in the regulatory domains in which it is most prominent. We also stress, however, 
that institutional resources and agenda-setting rights lend essential support to the debate 
choices of rank-and-file parliamentarians. We see only partial evidence for the more critical 
view that there is a government bias and that parliaments avoid EU debates near elections 
(Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). That popular Euroscepticism depresses debate seems most 
unlikely given strongly positive cross-national patterns and no obvious trends within 
countries. Hence, our analysis will likely be welcomed by those who see accountability 
potential in parliamentary EU debate (Auel and Raunio, 2014b; Auel et al., 2015; Bellamy 
and Kröger, 2016; Rauh and De Wilde, 2018). 
However, one should not ignore another way of looking at our results. For some 
parliaments, the high motivational and institutional hurdles that stand in the way of EU 
debates imply little debate (only exceptionally if debate is over-determined by frontbench 
and backbench interest). Moderate Euroscepticism and institutional capacity in Austria 
seems to encourage EU debates that, however, do not follow EU policy-making 
systematically. This is the mirror-image of our findings: namely, that more debates occur on 
day-to-day EU law-making and European Council meetings where significant extra-
parliamentary debate already happens (in highly Eurosceptic countries) or where significant 
intra-parliamentary EU monitoring is in place (through strong oversight institutions). 
Finally, regarding the general literature on the ’politicization’ of European integration (e.g. 
De Wilde and Zürn, 2012), our results caution that the parliamentary salience of the EU has 
not increased. In the parliamentary arenas that we study here, no increase happened since 
the early 2000s and little debate overall takes place in some countries (cf. Rauh and de 
Wilde, 2018). We only observe increasing debate—for some parties—in budget and finance 
policies since the onset of the Eurozone crisis (see the Online appendix). Second, the 
Eurosceptic challenger parties and intra-party dissenters that seem to be important for the 
extra-parliamentary politicization of the EU are neither essential for nor drivers of 
parliamentary EU debate. 
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Notes	
 
1 The Eurobarometer regularly asks EU citizens whether EU membership is a ‘good’ or ‘bad thing’. We subtract 
‘good’ from ‘bad’ responses and lag this measure by a year. Regarding the lag, one could argue that politicians 
rather respond to contemporary public opinion or, as we do, that they update their beliefs about public 
opinion with delay. In any case, the average, minimum, maximum and standard deviation of contemporary and 
lagged Euroscepticism are nearly identical. The lagged measure allows us to include 2012 in which the 
necessary Eurobarometer question was not asked. The index of EU oversight institutions, which Rauh and de 
Wilde (2018) also employ, captures the strength of parliamentary information rights, processing capacity such 
as committee structures devoted to the EU, and mandating procedures. Note that, within countries, oversight 
institutions change only twice, and marginally. 
2 Even though Austria’s Euroscepticism has reached Britain’s, it is more moderate. Austrian Euroscepticism is 
not mostly lower and less identity-based. The Eurobarometer shows that only 45 percent of Austrian citizens 
identified as “exclusively national” in 2010 compared to 63 percent in Britain. British discourse on the EU has 
been cautious and instrumental throughout post-War history (Jachtenfuchs et al., 1998). 
 
3 Our reliability tests focus on the EU relevance of a debate. In the Dutch case, we compared our coding to the 
official parliament assessment and corrected very few discrepancies. The Austrian, German, and Spanish data 
were coded by the authors. Then a new coder not previously involved and the original coder re-coded a 
random sample of about 40 plenary meetings with about 5 debates per meeting. In Germany: The original and 
the re-coded data agree in 92 percent of cases (Cohen’s k=0.8, 95%-CI: 0.71-0.89). In Austria: 95 percent 
agreement (Cohen’s k=0.88, 95%-CI: 0.80-0.93). In Spain: 92 percent agreement (Cohen’s k=0.83, 95%-CI: 0.66-
0.97). Research assistants coded the British data. We tested inter-coder reliability of the two coders who coded 
most debates for a random selection of about 40 meetings (186 debates), finding 89 percent agreement 
(Cohen’s k=0.7, 95%-CI: 0.59-0.80). 
4 We explored the option to focus on the Council of the EU, not the European Council. Häge (2016) measures 
the attention to different policies in the working parties of the Council. However, there is little variation in the 
policy focus of these working parties (see the Online appendix). Focusing on the European Council appears 
more promising. 
5 Rauh and de Wilde 2018) suggest that parties, which emphasize the EU in their election manifestos, also 
debate the EU more. However, at face value, there seems to be little empirical plausibility (see the Online 
appendix). 
6 Our analysis excludes parties that never held more than 5 percent of parliamentary seats. These parties nearly 
never initiate debates. Regarding the exclusion of challengers, the Online appendix shows that they are by no 
means exceptional drivers of debate. 
7 For practical reasons, we standardized all variables (expressing the mean as zero and standard deviations as 
unit changes). Second, note that the replication material includes a re-parameterized version of the model 
(with the standard deviation imported into the linear model). This re-parameterization is equivalent to the 
equation here but can be estimated much more efficiently. Third, we observe a small number of divergent 
iterations in some models (around one percent of iterations), which can be reduced through fine-tuning the 
target acceptance rate of the Markov chains, albeit at computational costs. Since doing so does not affect the 
findings and diagnostics are acceptable, we refrain from fine-tuning for the presented models. Finally, we also 
ran much longer Markov chains without changes in the results. 
8 The distribution of predictions in Spain contains some far outlying predictions, owed to the large uncertainty 
around some estimates. Therefore, the mean is a poor representation of the central tendency and we show the 
median. We have also excluded one outlying observation that strongly affected the estimates. The replication 
material allows re-producing these figures with the outlier. 
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